China's Ambassador to the Pacific, Qian Bo, takes questions from the media in Tonga. Photo: RNZ Pacific/ Lydia Lewis
Last week's Pacific Islands Forum leaders' summit ended dramatically when China demanded the conference communique be changed to eliminate a reference to Taiwan.
The document had made a reference to the Forum reaffirming its relations to Taiwan, which has been a development partner since 1992.
But the Chinese Ambassador to the Pacific, Qian Bo, was furious and the document was rewritten.
RNZ Pacific asked Massey University lecturer in security studies, Dr Anna Powles, what she made of all of this.
(The transcript has been edited for brevity and clarity.)
Anna Powles: I think for a start, it isn't actually surprising the way in which China, through its Special Envoy, Qian Bo, reacted to the inclusion of section 66 which reaffirms the 1992 agreement between the Pacific Islands Forum and Taiwan as a development partner. I don't think it's particularly surprising that China did react that way to the inclusion of it in the communique, given their own sensitivities.
However, it does raise serious questions about the level of influence that external actors have on the Pacific Islands Forum.
Don Wiseman: The pressure on the Forum over Taiwan goes back a long way. I can remember going to Forums 20 years ago, and the Taiwanese meeting would always be held off site, and a significant way off site. It's just remarkable that the Forum itself would buckle so easily.
AP: Look, I certainly do agree. I think this raises some very serious concerns about the way in which an external partner, such as China, is able to really seek to disrupt the status quo, and by that, I'm referring to Taiwan's relationship with the Pacific Island Forum, because it does effectively sit within the regional architecture as a consequence of the 1992 agreement. It also reflects the way in which China is seeking to utilise Forum processes in order to squeeze Taiwan even further.
Taiwan now has three allies remaining in the Pacific, that's Palau, Tuvalu and the Marshall Islands, and that has significant consequences. Going forward, for a period of time, the Pacific Islands Forum has been able to keep China at bay when it has sought to push the Forum to adopt a One China policy, or in Beijing's term, a one China principle. And the Forum has been able to push back on the basis that that it has a number of its members recognise Taiwan, but as the numbers there are dwindling, that becomes increasingly more difficult.
Now, of course, Solomon Islands has been key to all of this, because Prime Minister [Jeremiah] Manele raised the issue of Taiwan being a development partner, because of Taiwan being a non-sovereign country, and this really speaks to concerns, key flash points, that we can see down the track.
One of which obviously is the fact that Solomon Islands will be hosting the Pacific Islands Forum next year, which raises questions around Taiwan and the ability of Taiwan to participate, and Prime Minister Manele did not answer that question when asked at the press conference last week in Tonga.
But it also raises questions around, as part of the review of the regional architecture, there is a tiered approach that will be adopted. Tier one are the other strategic partners - so those countries that partner with the Forum, and tier two, which refers to the broader range of entities. The question here is: where does Taiwan fit between tier one and tier two? Those questions will certainly need to be answered.
DW: One of the odd things is the amount of aid that has come from Taiwan for the Pacific, particularly for countries like Nauru, over the years. Millions and millions of dollars that rescued that country before it discovered the value of having detention camps on the island, and got a heap of money from Australia, but they needed Taiwan to pay for everything. It's just astounding that now these countries can blithely forget about that. And the most zealous of all of the new friends is, it would seem, Kiribati.
AP: Indeed, across social media, has certainly been a topic of conversation about the way in which Taiwan, as you say, so recently a partner to Kiribati, to Solomon Islands, for instance, is effectively being sidelined in these attempts to really strip Taiwan of its status in the region. It's worth noting too that at the Forum last week Taiwan and the Forum signed another agreement with additional funds going from Taiwan to the Pacific Islands Forum. Taiwan is a development partner in the region, and has been for a long period of time.
These efforts to strip Taiwan of its status and to effectively disrupt and reshape the status quo within the regional architecture are deeply concerning, and the Pacific Islands Forum certainly need to really invest in ways to better manage these types of crises going forward, whether that be through establishing some forms of guardrails for instance.
Or even as part of the proposed Ocean of Peace declaration. But there really do need to be some serious discussions about how to better manage this because the dangers are that it could reinforce the divisions felt between the North Pacific and the rest of the Pacific. The Solomon Islands, as I said, is hosting the Forum meeting next year.
But then in 2026 Palau will be hosting the Forum meeting. We certainly do not want to see those splits that led to the Micronesian members seeking to withdraw from the Forum re-emerging, again, as a consequence of these geopolitical plays.
DW: What do you think will happen at this point? I mean what are they saying for instance, in Canberra or Washington about what happened the other day?
AP: The perspective is that China has effectively gotten its way by having the section 66 removed from the communique. The Secretariat [of the Forum] itself has stated that it was an error that that version of the communique went up online - that it was not the agreed communication. There's still a lack of transparency around the processes, the process by which this took place.
DW: It is actually odd that that reference was there. Taiwan has been an associate since 1992 but in various communiques, I can't remember any reference to Taiwan before, but someone, somewhere thought it was a good idea to put it in there.
AP: Exactly. And so that it isn't clear in my conversations with people in the region. It certainly does seem that that was an error, possibly coming out of conversations that were had at the leaders' retreat, perhaps. Then the decision was made to insert that. But certainly I can't imagine that there would have been consensus across all leaders to have that inserted into the communique, given Solomon Islands and Kiribati have both been fairly strong on Taiwan's position within the regional architecture. It is surprising.
I do think it's worth noting that the 92' agreement was in the 1992 Forum communique, which was actually held in Solomon Islands. There is a degree of synchronicity here. But also there are concerns around the way in which the Forum is sufficiently robust and able to withstand these types of pressures that we have seen over the past few days from China, and obviously there will be a great deal of concern in Canberra and Wellington about this.
But I would say, for Pacific countries, and you would know this very well, Don, there have been long standing concerns about the level of influence that a range of actors have had over the Forum agenda, including Australia and New Zealand.
This isn't necessarily new, but it is certainly no less concerning, particularly when we see footage of Special Envoy Qian Bo having a conversation with Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown, who assures him the communique will be corrected. So again, significant concern about the degree of overreach and influence and access that China has into the Forum processes.
