Senior Sergeant Roy Appley, who was in charge of the police communications centre on March 15, 2019, gives evidence at the coronial hearing. Photo: The Press / Iain McGregor
A senior police officer denies there was a breakdown of communication between police and ambulance staff on the day of the Christchurch mosque attacks.
The assurance came as coronial proceedings into the 2019 massacre resumed on Monday following a one- week recess.
Senior Sergeant Roy Appley faced a thorough interrogation around the synergy between police and ambulance staff in responding to the attack at the Linwood Islamic Centre.
The officer co-ordinated liaisons from the police's Southern Communications Centre on 15 March.
Counsel assisting the coroner David Boldt questioned him on a handful of issues, including the forewarning police received at 1.40pm from a Parliament worker.
Counsel assisting the coroner David Boldt questioned the witness on several issues. Photo: The Press / Iain McGregor
The call was a result of an email that included the gunman's manifesto and intent.
Police communications categorised the call as a "priority two", meaning it was virtually lost as other calls about the attacks were classified as the more urgent P1.
"You would agree with other witnesses, that this was the priceless nugget of information that people were looking for, namely information from the attacker which may have indicated where he was going next?"
Appley admitted he did not know about the call until "recently" when he was preparing for the inquest.
A police dispatcher previously told the inquest she would have sent units to evacuate Linwood Islamic Centre immediately if she was aware of the threat.
Boldt asked Appley what he would have done had he known about the threat.
"How I risk managed the whole event, I would've likely caused some preventative action to have happened," he replied.
Appley was also asked why the missed parliamentary call was not discussed during police debriefs.
"I expect that the information wasn't raised because no response was given to it," he said.
"I can't recall whether anyone did raise it."
Boldt pointed out the fact there was no response was the heart of the problem.
"A debrief of this kind should focus on the things that you did do, and look at room for improvement but also things that perhaps should've been done but were not done."
Appley was later grilled as to why it took 24 minutes for ambulances to be dispatched to Linwood after he requested them at 2.02pm.
Appley said he "ensured" ambulances would be dispatched.
Boldt countered this that "hoped" was the applicable word.
"You hoped that one of your staff members would take that information, pass it to an equivalent person within St John, and [they] would dispatch ambulances...that's what you believed was happening?"
He replied: "I don't believe, I know it was happening, I ensured it was happening."
"Then why did no ambulances go to Linwood until [2.34pm] that afternoon?" Boldt said.
The delay was believed to have been down to the safety of the scene at Linwood, something Appley did not know had been a factor.
He denied there had been a communication breakdown between police and ambulance staff.
"I'd be reluctant to say 'breakdown', because clearly I've given instruction for them to do something.
"They've heard it and they've responded, albeit some time later. But I don't think that's something I can comment on."
Appley will continue to give evidence on Tuesday.
The inquest will examine the following 10 issues over six weeks:
- Events of 15 March 2019 from the commencement of the attack until the terrorist's formal interview by police
- Response times and entry processes of police and ambulance officers at each mosque
- Triage and medical response at each mosque
- The steps that were taken to apprehend the offender
- The role of, and processes undertaken by, Christchurch Hospital in responding to the attack
- Coordination between emergency services and first responders
- Whether the terrorist had any direct assistance from any other person on 15 March 2019
- If raised by immediate family, and to the extent it can be ascertained, the final movements and time of death for each of the deceased
- The cause of death for each of the victims and whether any deaths could have been avoided
- Whether Al Noor Mosque emergency exit door in the southeast corner of the main prayer room failed to function during the attack and, if so, why?
The inquest continues.
